Dove e quando

Talk by Julia Langkau (University of Geneva)

ABSTRACT

Suppose an AI system produces artworks indistinguishable, in all observable respects, from those created by human artists. If creativity is attributed at the level of products—on the basis of novelty and value—then these works may appear to be the same. Philosophers have often resisted this conclusion by arguing that creativity requires a particular kind of process, one involving autonomy, intentional agency, or imagination. On such views, the nature of the process partly determines whether a product counts as genuinely creative. I pursue a different line of argument. Even if we grant that the products are identical with respect to novelty and value, and even if we set aside process-based criteria, our mode of engagement with them differs. Human artworks invite a dialogical stance: we relate to them as expressions of a valuing subject and as traces of a creative process in which we can imaginatively participate. If our engagement partly constitutes what a work is for us, then this difference in engagement calls into question whether the products are genuinely the same after all.